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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 19-3539 
___________ 
 
GEORGE A. JACKSON, 
                                  Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 M.D. KEITH IVENS; PRISON HEALTH SERVICES, INCORPORATED; 
 STANLEY TAYLOR; STATE OF DELAWARE; CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL 
SERVICES INC, Correctional Medical Services, Inc. and Correctional Medical Services 
of Delaware, Inc.; CARL C. DANBERG; JAMES C. WELCH; CORRECTIONAL 
MEDICAL SERVICES; CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL SERVICES OF DELAWARE, 
INC.; MD KEITH IVENS; PRISON HEALTH SERVICES, INC.; WARDEN RICK 
KEARNEY; DE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-01-cv-00559) 
District Judge:  Honorable Leonard P. Stark 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect, 
Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
April 23, 2020 
Before:  JORDAN, KRAUSE, and MATEY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 28, 2020) 
_________ 
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OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
George Jackson appeals the District Court’s denial of his motion filed pursuant to 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 as well as its order denying his motion for reconsideration.  For the 
reasons below, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s orders.  
Jackson, a Delaware inmate, filed a pro se complaint in 2001, alleging that 
Appellees were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.  While represented 
by counsel, Jackson entered into settlements with some defendants, and in 2012, the 
District Court granted the remaining defendants’ motion for summary judgment.  We 
affirmed the District Court’s judgment.  See C.A. No. 12-4155.  In 2018, Jackson filed a 
pro se motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60.  The District Court denied the motion as 
untimely and meritless.  Jackson filed a motion for reconsideration and a notice of appeal.  
After the District Court denied the motion for reconsideration, Jackson filed an amended 
notice of appeal.1 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
1  Because Jackson filed a timely motion for reconsideration of the District Court’s denial 
of the Rule 60(b) motion, the time period to file his notice of appeal began when the 
motion for reconsideration was denied.  See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A).  Thus, his notices 
of appeal were timely filed and we have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
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 In his Rule 60 motion, Jackson alleged that during a review of his medical files in 
2015, he discovered that Appellees did not disclose two medical records to him during 
the litigation.  Jackson claimed that he had a biopsy of an enlarged lymph node and 
agreed to an excisional biopsy to remove the node in 2000.  While he consented to the 
removal of the “right submandibular” lymph node, he asserted that the medical records 
indicate that the “right superior cervical” lymph node was removed.  He claimed that he 
did not consent to have that lymph node removed.  Jackson argued that if he had seen 
these medical records during the litigation, he would have settled his claims on more 
favorable terms and would have won a judgment against the medical provider.  He also 
discussed other medical issues that have arisen since the District Court’s 2012 judgment.   
Jackson based his motion on several subsections of Rule 60.  First, he argued that 
he was entitled to relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2) based on newly 
discovered evidence, i.e. the two medical records.  He also relied on Rule 60(b)(3), which 
provides for relief from judgment due to fraud or misconduct.  However, motions filed 
pursuant to subsections (2) and (3) must be filed no more than a year after the judgment.  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).  Jackson’s motion was filed far beyond that time limit.  
Moreover, he did not make any allegations that would support a conclusion that the 
Appellees purposefully and fraudulently withheld two medical records instead of simply 
overlooking two records out of 800 pages of medical records disclosed. 
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 In addition, Jackson relied on Rule 60(b)(6) which allows for relief from judgment 
for “any other reason that justifies relief.”  Such a motion must be made within a 
reasonable time, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1), and the litigant must show “extraordinary 
circumstances” to justify reopening a final judgment.  Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 
535 (2005).  Jackson has not shown that the motion was made within a reasonable time.  
He alleged that he discovered the medical records in September 2015, but he did not file 
the Rule 60(b) motion until three years later in November 2018.  Moreover, he does not 
explain why he could not have discovered these medical records years earlier.  Nor has 
Jackson made a showing of extraordinary circumstances.  Jackson has not explained why 
he would consent to the removal of one lymph node but not the other.  He has not shown 
how the alleged failure to disclose these two medical records affected the litigation of his 
claims. 
 Finally, Jackson relies on Rule 60(d)(3) which provides that Rule 60 does not limit 
a court’s power to set aside a judgment for fraud on the court.  Rule 60(d) allows a 
District Court to entertain an independent action for relief from judgment to prevent a 
grave miscarriage of justice.  Jackson v. Danberg, 656 F.3d 157, 166 (3d Cir. 2011).  As 
noted above, Jackson has not made a showing that Appellees fraudulently failed to 
disclose the medical records.  See Booker v. Dugger, 825 F.2d 281, 283 (11th Cir. 1987) 
(party seeking relief under Rule 60(d)(3) must show fraud by clear and convincing 
evidence).  Failing to reopen the District Court’s judgment would not lead to a grave 
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miscarriage of justice.  The District Court did not err in denying Jackson’s Rule 60 
motion. 
 In his motion for reconsideration, Jackson did not make any new arguments.  
Rather, he attached the medical records he had forgotten to attach to his Rule 60 motion.  
The District Court did not err in denying the motion for reconsideration. 
Summary action is appropriate if there is no substantial question presented in the 
appeal.  See Third Circuit LAR 27.4.  For the above reasons, as well as those set forth by 
the District Court, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order.  See Third Circuit 
I.O.P. 10.6.  
 
